What does Dennett say about p-zombies in this context?

What does Dennett say about p-zombies in this context?

• A. P-zombies could exist in principle.
• B. The hard problem is an illusion, and p-zombies are impossible.
• C. P-zombies are necessary for philosophical analysis.
• D. P-zombies are evidence for dualism.

Answer: (B)

Dennett’s stance here centers on how we should treat the supposed hard problem of consciousness and the idea of philosophical zombies. A p-zombie is a being that is physically identical to a person and behaves exactly like a person, but supposedly lacks any subjective experience. Dennett argues that the hard problem—the idea that there is some mysterious non-physical experience behind consciousness—is not something real or needed to understand the mind. He treats it as an illusion produced by our intuitions rather than an actual, separate problem of explanation. If the hard problem is illusory, then there’s no room for a being that is functionally identical to us yet lacks consciousness. In other words, the concept of a p-zombie collapses under a view that consciousness is fully explained by physical processes and functional organization. That’s why the statement that best fits his position is that the hard problem is an illusion and p-zombies are impossible. The other options don’t align with this view: saying p-zombies could exist would imply a real hard problem and a non-physical aspect to experience; claiming they’re necessary for analysis suggests a role Dennett doesn’t grant to p-zombies; and treating them as evidence for dualism directly contradicts his physicalist stance.

Dennett’s stance here centers on how we should treat the supposed hard problem of consciousness and the idea of philosophical zombies. A p-zombie is a being that is physically identical to a person and behaves exactly like a person, but supposedly lacks any subjective experience. Dennett argues that the hard problem—the idea that there is some mysterious non-physical experience behind consciousness—is not something real or needed to understand the mind. He treats it as an illusion produced by our intuitions rather than an actual, separate problem of explanation.

If the hard problem is illusory, then there’s no room for a being that is functionally identical to us yet lacks consciousness. In other words, the concept of a p-zombie collapses under a view that consciousness is fully explained by physical processes and functional organization. That’s why the statement that best fits his position is that the hard problem is an illusion and p-zombies are impossible.

The other options don’t align with this view: saying p-zombies could exist would imply a real hard problem and a non-physical aspect to experience; claiming they’re necessary for analysis suggests a role Dennett doesn’t grant to p-zombies; and treating them as evidence for dualism directly contradicts his physicalist stance.