In Chalmers' framing, what is a philosophical zombie (p-zombie)?

In Chalmers' framing, what is a philosophical zombie (p-zombie)?

• A. An atom-for-atom identical to a human but without phenomenological experience
• B. An entity that is fully conscious
• C. A machine that can feel emotions
• D. A dream-like figure

Answer: (A)

A philosophical zombie, in Chalmers’ framing, is something that is atom-for-atom identical to a human in every physical way but lacks subjective, phenomenological experience. The key idea is that all outward behavior, speech about feelings, and responses would be indistinguishable from a normal person, yet there would be no “what it’s like” inner experience. Chalmers uses this to illustrate that conceiving a being with the same physical structure and functions but without conscious experience is possible, suggesting that conscious experience might not be entailed by physical facts alone. So why this option fits best: it captures the essence that the entity is physically indistinguishable from a human while lacking consciousness. The other descriptions describe beings that either are conscious, or are machines with emotions, or are purely fictional/dream-like figures, none of which match the specific claim about lacking subjective experience despite normal physical and behavioral properties.

A philosophical zombie, in Chalmers’ framing, is something that is atom-for-atom identical to a human in every physical way but lacks subjective, phenomenological experience. The key idea is that all outward behavior, speech about feelings, and responses would be indistinguishable from a normal person, yet there would be no “what it’s like” inner experience. Chalmers uses this to illustrate that conceiving a being with the same physical structure and functions but without conscious experience is possible, suggesting that conscious experience might not be entailed by physical facts alone.

So why this option fits best: it captures the essence that the entity is physically indistinguishable from a human while lacking consciousness. The other descriptions describe beings that either are conscious, or are machines with emotions, or are purely fictional/dream-like figures, none of which match the specific claim about lacking subjective experience despite normal physical and behavioral properties.